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 1 
Introduction 
International organizations are formal entities with states as members and that possess a 
permanent secretariat, bureaucracy or some other form of permanent administration 
(Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004). Students of international organization pay 
special attention to the interaction between states and their administration. This 
interaction is believed to be fraught with delegation problems. Specifically, bureaucracies 
are suspected of using their informational advantages over the member states to deviate 
from their mandate and act against the states’ best interests. Scholars consequently ask if 
and how states can design institutional controls in order to prevent this problem of 
“bureaucratic drift” (Pollack 1997). 
While it is useful, I argue that the scholarly focus on bureaucratic drift may obscure other 
delegation problems that arise among the states themselves. These problems stem from 
the fact that bureaucracies are not unitary actors. They are permeable institutions that are 
susceptible to internal manipulation. Individual states may ignore collective control 
mechanisms and instead seek to influence the bureaucracy unilaterally from within. This 
need not be a problem per se, as one state’s influence gain does not necessarily equal 
another state’s loss. However, unilateral influence creates informational advantages that 
states can potentially abuse in order to bias policy implementation to the detriment of its 
cooperating partners. In that case, other states will react by stepping up their own 
unilateral influence and an inefficient and mutually costly “influence race” (Urpelainen 
2012, 705) ensues that slowly erodes cooperation. The prominent delegation problem of 
“bureaucratic drift,” which is based on informational asymmetries between states on one 
side, and the bureaucracy on the other side, is consequently overshadowed by what I refer 
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to as the problem of “interstate control,” which is rooted in informational asymmetries 
among the member states themselves. 
The central argument of this article is that the problem of interstate control and its 
potential institutional remedies play an important role in the operation of international 
organizations. For this purpose, the article complements popular principal-agent 
approaches to international organization with theoretical models from the literature on 
coalitions and coalition government (Laver and Shepsle 1990). Delegation problems in 
coalition governments arise from the fact that parties face trouble controlling the actions 
of their coalition partners within the government. To render the coalition bargain more 
credible and durable, coalition partners therefore devise mechanisms that allow them to 
“keep tabs” on each other (Thies 2001). Similarly, I argue that when states suspect that a 
cooperating partner’s unilateral influence within the bureaucracy might infringe their own 
interests, they will seek to avoid a subsequent erosion of their cooperation by allowing 
each other to monitor their actions through what I call “interstate control mechanisms.” 
Just like coalition partners allow “junior ministers” of one party to keep tabs on senior 
ministers of the opposite party, senior officials with a suspected bias towards one state 
are regularly shadowed by deputies with the opposite bias. In addition, just like coalition 
partners use parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms to monitor the other governing party’s 
executive decisions, states may coopt oversight mechanisms, which are meant for the 
principal as a whole or the public to control the bureaucracy, in order to reveal 
information about their cooperating partners’ unilateral activities within the same 
bureaucracy. 
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The argument that international organizations are fraught with the problem of interstate 
control has two empirical implications. First, it implies that interstate control mechanisms 
will emerge and be used in response to states’ attempts to abuse their unilateral influence 
to the detriment of others. Second, and in contrast to collective control mechanisms, 
interstate control mechanisms exist within rather than outside the bureaucracy, and serve 
to level informational asymmetries among the member states. Because data on unilateral 
influence within bureaucracies is rare and typically incomplete (McKeown 2009, 288), 
the paper illustrates these implications using the example of the European Commission, 
the European Union’s (EU) powerful supranational bureaucracy, for which a 
comparatively large amount of internal data have been made available.
1
 I recommend that 
my argument be interpreted as a plausibility probe of a theory that promises a more 
realistic analysis of the relationship between states and international bureaucracies. It 
thereby seeks to contribute to at least two bodies of literature.  
The first contribution is to the literature on international delegation (reviewed below). 
The article cautions against an indiscriminate application of principal-agent models to the 
study of international organization, as this carries the risk of exaggerating problems of 
bureaucratic drift while blinding the researcher to delegation problems that are already 
rooted in the interaction among the principals themselves. A pessimistic reading of this 
paper would therefore emphasize the fact that formal institutions, such as international 
bureaucracies, which are created in order to deal with cooperation problems, merely offer 
a new site for these problems to play out. However, this is but the first part of my 
argument. 
                                                        
1  The following analysis is based on primary sources from national (Bundesarchiv Koblenz) and EU 
archives (European Commission Historical Archive). 
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The second contribution of this article is to the literature on informal governance (Kleine 
2013a, 2014; Stone 2011). Rather than viewing regular deviations from formal rules as 
institutional pathologies, this literature describes informal practices that are inherent to 
and often even necessary for the daily operation of formal institutions. Specifically, the 
article builds on Urpelainen’s concept of “unilateral influence contests,” an ever-
intensifying zero-sum competition for greater influence on the bureaucracy (Urpelainen 
2012, 705). In contrast to Urpelainen, and building on my previous work on national 
fiefdoms, I posit that unilateral influence need not always be zero sum and may indeed 
offer opportunities for mutually beneficial exchanges of control over individual aspects 
of an international organization (Kleine 2013b). However, lacking information about the 
nature and reach of each other’s activities within the bureaucracy, states will assume that 
their partners abuse their unilateral influence to their detriment. In order to prevent these 
suspicions from turning into a unilateral influence contest, it is crucial for states to keep a 
watchful eye on each other in order to elicit information about one another’s activities. A 
more optimistic reading of the paper therefore highlights how less formal institutions 
stabilize cooperation even in the face of a regular circumvention of an organization’s 
formal rules.  
The paper begins with a discussion of how the possibility of unilateral influence within 
international bureaucracies creates problems of interstate control. The following section 
assesses the strengths and limitations of the analogy between delegation problems in 
coalition governments and international organizations. The theory developed in this 
section is subsequently illustrated with examples from the European Commission. The 
article concludes with a discussion of the theory’s scope, conditions and generalizability.  
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Beyond bureaucratic drift: the problem of interstate control 
While the application of principal-agent models to International Relations has shed 
invaluable light on the relationship between states and international bureaucracies, it has 
also obscured inefficiencies that are rooted in the interaction among the states 
themselves. The standard set up of the principal-agent problem is well known and is only 
briefly repeated here. An employer intends to delegate some tasks to an employee. Their 
interests, however, are not perfectly aligned and, if given the chance, the employee will 
act in ways that are not in the employer’s best interest. Anticipating this problem, the 
employer seeks to reduce informational asymmetries and devise mechanisms that align 
their interests. This mundane scenario has spawned a large literature on delegation 
problems in international politics where, analogous to the workplace, scholars argue that 
states suspect bureaucracies of acting against their best interest. (Bendor, Glazer, and 
Hammond 2001; Hawkins et al. 2006). There is wide scholarly agreement that states, like 
employers, anticipate this delegation problem and limit bureaucratic drift through various 
control mechanisms that are supposed to align the bureaucracy’s incentives with the 
states’ collective objectives (Pollack 1997, 129).2  
It is also widely acknowledged that the analogy to the workplace has its limits in the 
context of international politics, since neither the principal nor the agent is, in fact, an 
autonomous person in the Kantian sense with the capacity of self-determination. As a 
                                                        
2
 A distinction is drawn between preventive police-patrol mechanisms and punitive fire-alarm mechanisms 
(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, McCubbins, Noll and Weingast 1989). 
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large literature points out, the principal in international politics is typically composed of 
two or more states with heterogeneous preferences and bargaining power—a 
heterogeneity that, under certain conditions, enhances the agent’s autonomy as it 
becomes more difficult for states to agree on the use of control mechanisms (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003, 249; Martin 2006, 144; see, however, Lake and McCubbins 2006, 361-
362).
3
  
The bureaucracy, too, is not a unitary actor with the capacity to independently choose its 
actions. While employees are actual persons whose behavior principals can only seek to 
control from outside through incentives, bureaucracies are permeable structures that offer 
plenty of opportunities for states to manipulate the bureaucracy’s interests and strategies 
from inside (see also Elsig 2011; Kleine 2013a, b). The literature on informal governance 
describes a myriad of possibilities to bias policy implementation by an international 
organization through the manipulation of its staff and its funding. For example, states 
may press for the recruitment of co-nationals with similar preferences (Kleine 2013b, 
329-331; similarly, Novosad and Werker 2018) or they use career incentives and 
punishments in order to compel compatriots in the bureaucracy to bias policies in their 
favor (Wonka 2007, 182-183; Voeten 2008, 420; Chwieroth 2013;). Major powers can 
threaten to withhold funds or create complicated legal obstacles to the implementation of 
unpopular policies (Urpelainen 2012, 708; similarly Stone 2004).  
If we accept the premise that neither the principal nor the agent is an autonomous actor in 
the philosophical sense, the application of the P-A model to international organizations 
                                                        
3
 Lyne and colleagues (2006) distinguish between multiple and collective principals. In collective 
principals, members jointly decide on the terms of delegation and then enter into a single contract with the 
agent. With multiple principals, each principal enters into a separate contract with distinct terms. 
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yields a new implication. Given that the level of control of the agent is a function of the 
heterogeneity of preferences among the states, situations will arise in which states with 
outlier preferences are permanently dissatisfied with the actual level of control that is 
ultimately achieved. These states have an incentive to renege on the agreement about the 
use of external collective control mechanisms. They can also be expected to bypass these 
mechanisms and use unilateral influence in order to offset the perceived gap in 
bureaucratic control (Thompson 2007, 10; for an overview see Kleine 2014). 
When states use unilateral influence in addition to or instead of external collective 
controls, this has important implications for our understanding of delegation problems in 
international organizations. First, it implies that the problem of bureaucratic drift, which 
is rooted in bureaucrats’ ability to acquire private information, is potentially less severe 
than the standard principal-agent model predicts, as states have additional means of 
controlling the agent from inside (similarly, Stone 2009). Second, it implies that, under 
certain conditions, new informational asymmetries may arise in the process of unilateral 
influence on the bureaucracy, this time among the member states themselves (Kleine 
2013c, 249). These asymmetries create a new delegation problem that poses a distinct 
threat to durability of international cooperation. 
To be clear, the very existence of unilateral influence in an information-rich environment 
need not become a problem. As argued elsewhere, in international organizations dealing 
with multiple issues, it may even offer the opportunity for states to engage in the 
mutually beneficial exchange of control. This exchange brings about national fiefdoms in 
which (groups of) states tolerate each other’s special influence over those aspects of the 
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international organization that they value the most (Kleine 2013b). In addition, one state 
may simply hide behind the unilateral influence of another state with similar preferences.  
However, if states lack information about just how far their partners take their unilateral 
influence within the international bureaucracy, they will assume the worst. An inefficient 
influence race, not unlike an arms race in situations of imperfect information (Downs et 
al 1985, 135), might ensue as each state constantly tries to offset the presumed harmful 
dominance of others. An influence race like this threatens to waste resources and erode 
cooperation (Urpelainen 2012, 716-719). I refer to this situation as the problem of 
interstate control. 
 
 
Keeping tabs on cooperating partners 
The previous section asserted that cooperation is potentially more fragile than the P-A 
literature suggests when international organizations, which we assume to be permeable 
and susceptible to states’ unilateral influence, become but another site for cooperation 
problems to play out. It was also argued that unilateral influence becomes a problem 
under conditions of informational asymmetry among the member states that leads states 
to suspect cooperating partners of abusing their unilateral influence on the bureaucracy at 
their expense. This section argues that these two features of the problem of interstate 
control—the fragility of cooperation and the lack of information about each other’s action 
within the bureaucracy—bear resemblance to problems in the formation and operation of 
coalitions.  
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In International Relations, coalitions are characterized by their ephemeral nature. They 
are typically created in an ad hoc manner in order to achieve a tangible common goal 
(Riker 1962, 159). In domestic politics, legislative coalitions are transitory by design. 
They are at the latest dissolved at the end of a legislative term and may also lose the 
confidence of the parliament at any time. The literature in comparative politics therefore 
raises the question of how long coalition governments persist, and why (Diermeier 
2008)? In a seminal paper, Laver and Shepsle (1990) introduce the idea of the structure-
induced equilibrium to parliamentary democracies, arguing that a certain allocation of 
portfolios can create a stable majority core that allows for the formation of government. 
A growing literature in this field now discusses additional institutional solutions that 
allow coalitions partners to render their cooperation more durable. 
 
International organizations as coalition governments 
In parliamentary democracies, especially those with proportional representation, 
governments often consist of a coalition of two or more parties. For the purpose of 
forming a coalition, parties must agree on common objectives (the coalition treaty) they 
would like to pursue during the legislative term as well as on the allocation of portfolios 
(e.g., finance, environment) among party representatives (Laver and Shepsle 1990, 1996). 
Parliamentary supporters of a coalition therefore delegate authority not only to their own 
party’s cabinet ministers, but also to ministers of their party’s coalition partner.  
The delegation of authority to ministers from their own party does not pose a problem in 
this literature as parties are expected to have ample means at their hand to control their 
own members. However, the parties in government expect to face difficulties controlling 
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the ministers of their coalition partner. Informational asymmetries about each partner’s 
reign over their respective departments offer opportunities for all coalition partners to 
bias government policy beyond what has been agreed in the coalition bargain. In other 
words, there is an agency problem only with respect to those parts of the bureaucracy 
over which the parties have less oversight. 
A similar logic applies to international organizations if we allow for the possibility of 
unilateral influence within the bureaucracy. Similar to coalition governments, 
international organizations are created through an international treaty that identifies 
common objectives and delegates their implementation to an international bureaucracy. If 
we acknowledge that this bureaucracy is susceptible to unilateral influence, we can posit 
a delegation problem similar to that faced by coalition governments. While unilateral 
influence on policy implementation need not be a zero sum game, it becomes problematic 
when states have little information about one another’s activities within the bureaucracy 
and, therefore, have to suspect that cooperating partners are abusing their unilateral 
influence at others’ expense. It is not the existence of unilateral influence per se, but the 
fact that states suspect the abuse of this influence, which opens the door to the problem of 
interstate control. 
 
Keeping tabs on coalition partners 
If states lack information about whether or not cooperating partners abuse their influence 
to an extent that infringes on their own interests, they will seek to match the presumed 
gap in control with even more unilateral influence of their own. A costly influence 
contest follows that slowly erodes cooperation after all. Aware of this permanent threat to 
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the stability of government, the comparative literature identifies a number of mechanisms 
that reduce informational asymmetries and allow cooperating partners to keep tabs on one 
other’s actions within the bureaucracy.  
A direct approach consists of shadowing one’s cooperating partner. Thies (2001) argues 
that in order to scrutinize a coalition partner’s governing activity, parties create the 
position of “junior ministers” within rival ministries. Working in close proximity, junior 
ministers monitor the senior minister’s action in order to prevent her from building up 
private information within the respective department. In line with the argument made 
above about the incentives of preference outliers to circumvent collective control 
mechanisms, Thies (585-586) predicts that this mechanism is especially relevant when 
one of the coalition partners holds more extreme preferences on an issue and, therefore, 
has incentives to depart from the coalition deal (e.g. social democrats on labor issues, or a 
green parties on the environment). Müller and Strøm (2000) provide evidence for the use 
of junior ministers in coalition governments.  
The similarity of the delegation problems in coalition governments and international 
organizations suggests that we can expect functional equivalents to junior ministers in 
international bureaucracies. In other words, states will use loyal staff in order to report 
back on the activities in those parts of the bureaucracy that are dominated by cooperating 
partners, especially if these partners’ interests differ from their own. As discussed below, 
the EU member states used different ways to shadow their partners within the 
Commission, from the practice of triumvirates of commissioners at the political level to 
informal quotas about a minimum of national diversity in the composition of 
departmental units at lower administrative levels.  
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Martin and Vanberg (2005, 97) argue that the time and resource constraints confronting 
cabinets hinder ministers, especially those of small parties, from monitoring their partners 
more directly. They propose a public solution to the coalitional delegation problem 
(Martin and Vanberg 2004). In their view, parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms, such as 
committee oversight or question time, can be used to counteract problems posed by 
ministerial autonomy. Martin and Vanberg show empirically that while typically thought 
of as instruments of the opposition, these mechanisms are often co-opted by coalition 
partners in order to reduce informational asymmetries among them (Martin and Vanberg 
2005, 97). 
Shadowing a cooperating partner can be costly and therefore an option that is mainly 
available to large and wealthy states (see, e.g., Dijkstra 2015). We would therefore expect 
smaller states to make do with existing mechanisms that they co-opt in order to elicit 
information about the reach of other states’ unilateral influence. Although many 
international organizations lack the scrutiny mechanisms available in parliamentary 
democracies, there are other more public instruments that would allow smaller states to 
compel their larger counterparts to reveal some of their activities within the bureaucracy. 
Further below we shall see how coordination meetings among senior commission 
officials were repurposed in order to spot implementing decisions that could potentially 
infringe on other governments’ political interests. 
 
Differences between coalition governments and international organizations 
How far does the analogy between coalition governments and international organizations 
travel? Coalition governments differ from international organizations because the former 
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typically have an expiration date that the latter do not.
4
 Furthermore, since the breakup 
and formation of governments are constitutive of democracies, the transition process in 
parliamentary democracies is designed in ways that reduce transaction costs, whereas the 
breakup of international cooperation is often prohibitively costly.
5
 One might therefore 
object that information is useless without a credible punishment for an abuse of unilateral 
influence. If a costly influence contest is the only option in response to an abuse of 
unilateral influence, states might shy away from delegating authority to an international 
organization to begin with (Urpelainen 2012, 706; cf. Manulak 2017).  
It should be noted that the threat to end a coalition is a drastic step that, depending on a 
party’s electoral prospects, is not always credible in the domestic context either. Some 
scholars argue that government coalitions therefore require some level of hierarchy 
among the party leaders in order to mediate conflicts (Andeweg 2000, 383; Strøm and 
Müller 1999, 273-275). A similar option is available in the international context where 
heads of state, at the side of a major summit, often deal with conflicts over more 
mundane issues of staffing and funding of an international organization. 
Furthermore, the fact that international organizations are typically more durable than 
coalition governments implies that states should care about their reputation. Stone (2011, 
45) argues that in these situations of (infinitely) repeated interaction states have an 
incentive to build a reputation for restraint. If they manage to level informal 
informational asymmetries among them, we can expect states to reach an equilibrium 
where they refrain from abusing their unilateral influence to the detriment of their 
                                                        
4
 Koremenos (2005, 557) finds that nearly a third of international agreements have an indefinite duration. 
The average duration of finite agreements is ten years.  
5
 Keohane (1984, 102) argued that international regimes persist due to sunk costs and high transaction costs 
of change. 
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cooperating partners in order to avoid retaliation and a subsequent influence contest that 
spirals out of control. 
One might further object that it is more difficult for states to exert unilateral influence on 
international bureaucracies than it is for a coalition party to influence a ministry beyond 
the coalition agreement. After all, ministries are meant to be responsive to changes in 
political preferences whereas international bureaucracies are typically designed to resist 
varying political and popular pressure. In this view, international organizations are more 
similar to regulatory agencies than to government departments (Majone 1994). However, 
this is a difference in degree, not in kind. The insulation of international bureaucracies 
from unilateral influence is an empirical question, and the literature on informal 
governance shows that scholars should not underestimate states’ ingenuity when it comes 
to finding legal or nonlegal ways around the formal rules (Urpelainen 2012, 718). 
 
In sum, the similarities of the delegation problem in coalition governments and in 
international organizations suggests that we can expect states to devise interstate control 
mechanisms in order to “keep tabs” on one another’s unilateral action within an 
international organization. The theory implies that these mechanisms emerge in response 
to an abuse of unilateral influence that infringes on other states’ interests, and that they 
exist inside rather than outside of the bureaucracy. The following two sections evaluate 
these implications using the example of the European Commission and anecdotes from 
other international organizations. 
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Problems of interstate control in the EU and beyond 
Before turning to the emergence and use of interstate control mechanisms, we first 
establish that the problem of interstate control within international organizations is real 
and carries the risk of an erosion of cooperation. For example, a problem of interstate 
control emerged within the United Nations (UN), especially at the height of the Cold 
War, as national “fiefdoms” in this bureaucracy (Meron 1977, 93-100; 1991, 322; Ameri 
2003, 20-28) engaged in an influence contest in which more and more states 
“[succumbed] to a vicious circle in that no state is ready to be the first to honor [the 
formal independence of the Secretariat] and, consequently, lose its stake and power” 
(Ameri 2003, 9). Reviewing the activities of Soviet nationals within the UN Secretariat in 
the early 1980s, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concludes that “the 
Soviets will maintain a distinct advantage in the United Nations until their diplomatic and 
intelligence efforts are matched by systematic, long-term Western opposition (United 
States Senate 1985, 2). Similar anecdotes of how some countries’ unilateral influence on 
the political and judicial decision-making process prompts other countries to follow suit 
exist for the World Trade Organization (Yi-chon and Weller 2004, 265-266; Stone 2011, 
80-102). 
The problem is most pronounced in the case of the EU where confusion about each 
member state’s reach inside the Commission triggered a race for unilateral influence that 
threatened to spiral out of control and paralyze the EU bureaucracy.  
 
 16 
The European Commission from a principal-agent perspective 
Like any other international organization, the EU is based on interstate agreements that 
spell out the objectives and rules of cooperation. The EU institutions implement these 
objectives in a decision-making process which can be characterized as follows: The 
Commission sets the agenda by submitting a proposal for a legislative act. After 
submission, governments in the Council of Ministers either adopt the legal act jointly 
with the European Parliament by majority vote, or they amend it unanimously. Finally, 
the European Commission, national administrations, or both, implement the legal act. 
The European Commission is, therefore, the EU’s principal bureaucracy, tasked with the 
formulation and implementation of EU law (Nugent 2010, 122-133). It is composed of an 
administrative layer of permanent civil servants that is itself divided into several 
departments (Directorate-Generals, DGs), and a political layer composed of 
commissioners.
6
 Commissioners are nominated by the member states for a five-year term 
and responsible for a specific portfolio that falls under the remit of one or more DGs. 
Similar to a government cabinet, the commissioners form a “college” that is headed by 
the Commission president. The college acts on the basis of collegiality, meaning that its 
members are responsible for the Commission’s actions as a whole.  
The Commission’s powers in agenda setting and implementation are often explained with 
reference to the standard principal-agent model, according to which the member states, 
the principals, delegate authority to an autonomous entity, the Commission (Pollack 
1997). Specifically, it has been argued that because governments are at risk of reneging 
on their commitments due to incentives to respond opportunistically to special interests, 
                                                        
6
 Conditional on the European Parliament’s approval, the member states appoint the president of the 
Commission, who himself must agree to the composition of his college. 
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they delegate authority to an independent agent that is shielded from ad-hoc political 
influence (Majone 1994; Moravcsik 1998). Viewed from this principal-agent perspective, 
the main delegation problem that ensues from this act of delegation is bureaucratic drift: 
the possibility that the Commission abuses its authority against the member states’ best 
interests. However, Pollack (1997, 114-116) argues that states anticipate this problem and 
consequently devise collective control mechanisms in order to align the Commission’s 
incentives with their own. Among these collective control mechanisms are so-called 
comitology committees, composed of state officials that monitor the Commission’s 
executive functions (Pollack 1997, 114-115). 
 
The limits of Commission autonomy and opportunities for unilateral influence 
In theory, the Commission and its employees are not supposed to take instructions from 
their native country, party or any other group. In reality, however, the Commission is but 
an institution that is not immune to influence from outside and within its own structures. 
The literature on informal governance points to two channels of unilateral influence: 
resources and staffing. Since the Commission can partly draw on its own system of 
resources, unilateral influence inside the Commission typically takes the route of 
recruiting likeminded staff and rewarding favorable decisions.  
 A first way for member states to exert unilateral influence inside the Commission is 
through the co-option of its political level. As Wonka (2008) argues, states deliberately 
nominate commissioners that share their interests and are easy to control through career 
incentives. There is also evidence that member states place “their” commissioners 
strategically in areas that are of special sensitivity to them (Kleine 2013b). Insiders agree 
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that governments do not shy away from using their commissioners in order to influence 
the Commission’s internal decision-making process, although, as a former Commission 
official admits, some countries are better at masking this influence than others (Interview, 
18 February 2014). Another former Commission official speaks of 
“intergovernmentalism under camouflage” (Interview 14 February 2014), a system in 
which commissioners use their position, at a minimum, to defend their home country’s 
“red lines” in the formulation and implementation of EU law (Interviews 28 February 
2014a and b). In light of these testimonies, it is not surprising that Thomson (2008, 187) 
finds that legislative proposals are systematically closer to the position of the home 
country of the commissioner responsible for this proposal than to the position of other 
member states. 
Unilateral influence is not confined to the Commission’s political level. It penetrates the 
administrative level, the “services,” as well. When this happens, the pressure on the 
services to bias policy implementation originates from the commissioner’s personal 
offices, the cabinets (not to be confused with government cabinets), which came to serve 
as transmission belts between the political and the administrative level. Typically 
composed of the commissioner’s co-nationals, drawn from national administrations and 
the commissioner’s party,7 they became a means for the home government to keep itself 
informed about the service’s activities in order to raise, if deemed necessary, objections 
against decisions in the making (European Communities 1979, 56). The size and 
influence of the cabinets grew considerably in the 1960s and 1970s (Michelmann 1978, 
495; Poullet and Deprez 1976, 53). 
                                                        
7
 In recent years, the composition between nationals and co-nationals has changed and varies across 
countries. See Deckarm 2017, 458. 
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Influence contests and problems of interstate control 
As the quotes above illustrate, unilateral influence within the Commission has been an 
open secret and not always considered a problem. However, we argued above that the 
lack information about a cooperating partner’s reach and purpose of unilateral influence 
can trigger a costly influence race and, thus, the slow erosion of cooperation. This is what 
happened a number of times in the Commission.  
The first Commission under the presidency of Hallstein in the 1960s gained notoriety for 
its conflicts with the French President De Gaulle. It is less known that it was also rocked 
by conflicts among the member states that were mirrored in rifts within the college itself. 
Arguably the most important conflict among the member states at that time was the 
organization of the market for agricultural goods. This conflict pitted France and other 
countries with important agricultural exports against Germany, a net consumer. Whereas 
France, Italy and The Netherlands hoped for a quick organization of this market with 
substantial state intervention, Germany prioritized a quick liberalization of the trade in 
industrial goods (Moravcsik 2000, 5). These differences among the states were mirrored 
inside the college of Commissioners, with the French and Dutch commissioners 
defending an interventionist organization of the common market, and the German 
commissioner for competition, von der Groeben, defending a more liberal market order 
(van der Harst 2007, 355; Marjolin 1986, 308; Bitsch 2007, 203). 
At about the same time, the member states began to worry about their clout within the 
Commission. An example of this problem of interstate control is a discussion in the 
1960s in an internal meeting of the committee of undersecretaries of German ministries 
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(Staatssekretärausschuss). The German ministry of agriculture complains to its 
colleagues that other countries remained in close touch with their own citizens within the 
Commission. It worries quietly that this offered their cooperating partners an unfair 
advantage. 
The free circulation of goods in Europe means that the European 
Commission’s power will grow considerably, especially with regard to 
the organization of the common agricultural market… With regard to 
this situation it is necessary to acquire information about the 
Commission’s initiatives at an early stage and communicate German 
views on these matters to the responsible services. It is well known that 
other countries, France, Italy and the Netherlands in particular, have 
especially in recent years maintained close ties to their citizens inside 
the Commission. Although we must not exaggerate the influence that 
stems from these contacts (…), there can be no doubt that it is essential 
that the German government improve its contacts to German citizens 
inside the Commission (Bundesministerium für Landwirtschaft 1967, 1-
2, my translation). 
This quote demonstrates the similarities between delegation problems in coalition 
governments and the problem of interstate control. Unilateral influence over parts of the 
bureaucracy is not considered a problem per se. However, similar to parties in a coalition, 
the ministry worries about their partners’ abusing their unilateral influence on the 
Commission at Germany’s expense. Lacking adequate information about other countries’ 
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actions, the Staatssekretärausschuss recommends following suit and, thus, engaging in a 
unilateral influence race. 
Interstate control problems became even more problematic during the presidency of the 
French socialist Delors from 1985 until 1995. Although this era is generally regarded as 
the Commission’s heyday, Delors’ second term was marked by strong conflicts among 
the member states that were mirrored in growing rifts within the college of 
commissioners. Having brought the Single Market on its way, Delors’ commission faced 
a new bone of contention – strengthening the market’s social aspects.. Reflecting their 
home countries’ market-liberal stance at that time, the commissioner for competition 
policy, the Irishman Sutherland, and his successor, the Englishman Brittan, became 
increasingly critical of Delors’ leadership (Peterson 2010). Delors’ cabinet, which was 
overwhelmingly composed of French nationals, supposedly became increasingly 
patronizing toward other commissioners and their personal offices (Endo 1999, 46; Ross 
1995, 63-68). His policy stance and behavior increasingly fueled criticism that Delors 
was abusing his authority in order to pursue French national interests (Cini 1996, 190). In 
reaction to perceptions of growing French influence within the Commission, other 
commissioners reacted by strengthening their own personal offices and thereby their grip 
on the Commission services. The total number of the commissioners’ personal staff 
consequently spiraled out of control during this time. By 1989, personal staff exceeded 
three hundred in total or on average twenty-five staff members per commissioner, 
compared to an average of fourteen in the 1970s. This expansion was only possible 
because the commissioners circumvented official quotas for the size of cabinets, for 
example, by employing staff on the payroll of national governments (Ludlow 1991, 93). 
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In other words, the college became the site of another influence contest among the 
member states. As one senior official explained, “[Delors’] cabinets are very active, and 
other cabinets are responding” (Peterson 1999, 56). 
In light of the Commission’s experience with influence contests, it is not surprising that a 
large part of the cabinets’ responsibility is to keep track of the activities of other 
commissioner’s personal offices (Interview with a former senior Commission official, 28 
February 2014). If they were mainly tasked with supporting the commissioner in her area 
of responsibility, we would expect cabinets to be composed of policy experts in this 
particular field. Yet, cabinets comprise primarily people that are experts in precisely the 
fields that do not fall under their commissioner’s remit (Spence 2006b, 62). Their role has 
consequently been likened to that of internal spies.  
A Commissioner’s cabinet is not only interested in its own portfolio; it 
also keeps a watchful eye on the portfolios of other Commissioners. 
[The cabinet member] has to be a kind of internal spy. To do this job, 
he has to know what is going on in the DG—and this is not always 
straightforward… Ultimately, a mandarin has to detect draft proposals 
of a possible competitor far in advance, because information, if timely 
received, is power (Eppink 2007, 115-116). 
In sum, the Commission is fraught with the problem of interstate control, which is rooted 
in the member states’ unilateral influence over parts of their administration. Several times 
in the Commission’s existence, this problem spiraled out of control and into a costly 
influence contest among the member states over their administration. To be sure, some 
governments are less aggressive than others in pursuing their national interests within the 
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bureaucracy, and some staff might be less susceptible to unilateral influence than others. 
However, it is apparent that unilateral influence exists within the walls of the 
Commission and, when combined with a lack of information, it threatens to paralyze the 
EU bureaucracy through inefficient influence contests. 
 
Interstate control mechanisms in the European Commission 
The example of coalition governments suggests that it is possible to contain influence 
races and level informational asymmetries among coalition partners by shadowing one 
another (junior ministers) or publicly questioning ministers about their actions 
(parliamentary scrutiny). Similar mechanisms can be found within the European 
Commission.  
 
“Junior ministers” 
Coalition partners can shadow the senior minister in order to monitor a potential abuse of 
her discretion. Functional equivalents of “junior ministers” already existed in the early 
years of the Commission. In the 1960s, each commissioner was given prime 
responsibility over one specific policy and ancillary responsibilities for one or two more 
policy areas (Spence 2006b, 62). During the Hallstein presidency, the commissioner for 
agriculture, the Dutchman Mansholt, would therefore have to consult with the German 
commissioner von der Groeben and the Luxembourgian Schaus (Lindberg 1963, 72). 
This mechanism became impractical and eventually defunct with a growing workload in 
the late 1960s that made it impossible for commissioners to take on responsibilities 
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beyond their core remit (Spence 2006a, 152). It is at about the same time that the 
aforementioned unilateral influence race gains in speed within the Commission. 
A similar mechanism surfaced at the intersection between the Commission’s political and 
administrative layer. It became an informal norm in the 1960s that if the commissioner 
was of a certain nationality, the most senior civil servant in his jurisdiction, the Director 
General, was expected to be of a different nationality (Lindberg 1963, 72; Coombes 
1970, 132). The same norm is applied within the DGs between the Directors General and 
their deputies. If this norm were merely meant to strike a certain national balance among 
senior ranks within each DG, we would expect the same norm to apply also between the 
commissioner and the deputy Director Generals. However, it is not uncommon for co-
nationals to serve in the senior ranks of the same or overlapping policy areas.
8
 It seems 
intuitive that the norm is not primarily meant to guarantee a fair national balance. It is 
plausible to argue that its primary function is to prevent the buildup of private 
information about the reach of unilateral national influence within the higher echelons of 
the bureaucracy. 
Administrative reforms in the 1990s served a similar purpose. Commission president 
Prodi insisted that either the chefs de cabinet (the heads of the commissioners’ personal 
offices) or her deputy be of a different nationality than the commissioner, and that the 
commissioner’s personal offices comprise at least three different nationalities (Agence 
Europe 1999). These quotas are insufficient to attain a national balance within the 
cabinets, but they appear to be geared towards preventing informational asymmetries 
about the commissioners’ activities. According to insiders, the reforms led to the 
                                                        
8
 An overview of nationalities within DGs can be accessed at: 
ec.europa.eu/civil_service/about/who/dg_en.htm (19 February 2016). 
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emergence of informal networks across the personal offices of the different 
commissioners that substantially improved the flow of information among them 
(Interview with a former senior Commission official, 28 February 2014b; Interview with 
a senior Commission official, 6 March 20014; Interview with a senior member of cabinet, 
11 March 2014). Although they did not prevent commissioners from giving the policy of 
their responsibility a certain national imprint (Thomson 2008), the reforms allow others 
to remain informed about just how far this bias might go. 
 
“Parliamentary scrutiny” 
Martin and Vanberg propose a second way for parties to police their coalition bargain. 
They argue that because some coalition parties face resource constraints, they instead use 
open debates and question times in order to “’check up’ on their partners and, if 
necessary, to ‘correct’ the actions of hostile ministers” (Martin and Vanberg 2005, 97). 
Similarly, some states face limits in monitoring the actions of the Commission’s highest 
ranks. Each year the Commission prepares several hundred legislative proposals, and it 
takes many more decisions regarding the implementation of policies. This workload 
offers ample opportunities for commissioners to frame issues in such a way as to avert 
close scrutiny (Wille 2013, 82). It is therefore not surprising that we can find functional 
equivalents of the “parliamentary scrutiny” mechanism in the Commission. There are at 
least two opportunities to vet each commissioner’s actions through open debate before 
draft texts are submitted to the college of commissioners. In regular meetings (called 
special chefs), the members of the cabinets that are responsible for a specific item on the 
agenda have the opportunity to raise questions about all aspects of a draft text. These 
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meetings are followed by weekly meetings (called Hebdos) where the chefs de cabinet 
discuss whether or not the draft text is ready for the college of commissioners to adopt it 
without an open debate. 
One might object that this mechanism primarily serves the internal coordination of 
policies within the Commission. This might well be the case, and we should not forget 
that even parliamentary scrutiny mechanisms in coalition governments are primarily a 
means of the opposition to control the government that are nevertheless co-opted by 
coalition partners in order to keep themselves informed about their partners’ actions. 
Thus, while debates at the cabinet level may serve the coordination of policies, they are 
also used in order to scrutinize for the degree of unilateral influence that went into them 
and their likely political repercussions in other member states. A senior cabinet member 
confesses that it is one of his main tasks in these meetings “to spot dossiers that proceed 
below the radar level” but might stir up national sensitivities at home (Interview 11 
March 2014). David Spence, an intimate observer of the Commission, concurs that it is 
the purpose of these meetings to avoid intense biases that impinge upon one of the 
member states’ interests. 
It should be remembered that [in these meetings] the cabinets will defend 
both their own Commissioner’s interests and the Commissioner’s national 
interest. They will be fully briefed by ‘their’ permanent representation and 
national officials about what is at stake (2006a, 151). 
 
In sum, several mechanisms within the Commission, akin to the monitoring tools of 
coalition governments, allow the member states to keep the problem of interstate control 
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in check. By reducing informational asymmetries about the reach and purpose of one 
another’s unilateral influence, they are able to build a reputation for restraint in the sense 
that states use their unilateral influence only up the point that it infringes on their 
partners’ interests. According to a contemporary observer, defending one’s home 
country’s interest within the Commission is a generally tolerated practice “unless it 
becomes too blatant and obstructive” (Interview 14 February 2014; Interview 28 
February 2014a). 
 
Discussion and conclusion 
The objective of this article was twofold. First, it identified a bias in standard principal-
agent models toward the analysis of bureaucratic drift and a concurrent blind spot for 
delegation problems that are rooted in the interaction among the principals themselves. It 
was argued that the possibility of unilateral influence within an international bureaucracy 
implies that bureaucracies might be less autonomous than generally believed. At the same 
time, unilateral influence creates new informational asymmetries among the member 
states and the challenge for them to identify actions that potentially harm their own 
interests. Second, the article made the case for approaching international organizations as 
coalition governments in which cooperating partners seek to distinguish appropriate from 
inappropriate unilateral influence. It was argued that states stabilize the potentially brittle 
cooperative equilibrium by keeping a watchful eye on one another’s actions within the 
shared bureaucratic apparatus. I illustrated the plausibility of these claims using the case 
of the European Commission and anecdotes from the United Nations.  
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One might object that states anticipate the problem of interstate control in their 
institutional design and devise mechanisms to prevent states from exerting unilateral 
influence in the first place (see, e.g., Manulak 2017). However, it is questionable that 
institutional designs can ever be perfect (Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal 2001, 1082). If 
we then accept the fact that states are unable to anticipate and thwart all opportunities for 
unilateral influence, we are left with the question of when and where the problem of 
interstate control arises and overshadows the problem of bureaucratic drift.  
Are all international organizations then bound to develop problems of interstate control or 
is this problem limited to the case of the EU? For reasons of simplification, we assumed 
that any international organization is in principle susceptible to unilateral influence. 
Given that states’ unilateral influence can but need not be zero sum, the problem of 
interstate control emerges when states lose sight of the nature and reach of their partners’ 
activities within the bureaucracy. In other words, the problem is rooted in informational 
asymmetries among the member states and is, from a theoretical perspective, not limited 
to a specific international organization. However, it can be argued that informational 
asymmetries are a function of the formal institutional architecture. In a bureaucracy as 
vast and as complex as the European Commission or the UN General Secretariat, we 
would expect it to be easier for states to hide the true purpose of their actions and more 
difficult for states to keep track of their partners’ activities. In international organizations 
that deal with fewer issues and possess a leaner administration, the extent and purpose of 
a state’s unilateral influence should be more immediately apparent. 
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Is unilateral influence a privilege of the powerful?
9
 Having discussed institutional 
opportunities for covert unilateral influence, let us now take a look at states’ incentives 
and resources. For states to step up their unilateral influence on the bureaucracy, they 
must be dissatisfied with the actual level of collective control. This happens when their 
preferences become more extreme relative to the member state mean. Dissatisfied with 
the actual level of bureaucratic control, they will seek to make up the perceived control 
gap through influence of their own. We saw this happening in the EU when growing 
tensions among (groups of) member states translated into rifts within the Commission. 
This conflict went hand in hand with a contest for greater unilateral control on the 
bureaucracy.  
While all states may develop incentives to step up their unilateral influence, they may not 
all have the capacity to do so. Indeed, if unilateral influence were cheap, bureaucracies 
would be expendable. In other words, certain forms of unilateral influence must be 
considered a privilege of powerful, affluent states. The same holds true for surveillance 
mechanisms. As argued above, it will be easier but arguably less effective for smaller 
states to co-opt existing scrutiny mechanisms than to shadow their partners’ actions in 
other departments. More research is needed on the types of unilateral influence and 
surveillance mechanisms, but it seems safe to say that interstate control problems largely 
play out between larger states, with smaller states struggling to remain up to date.
10
 
                                                        
9
 For a discussion of the normative implications of informal power  see Kleine forthcoming. 
10
 Elsig (2011, 508) finds that small states explicitly use their Geneva-based national representatives in 
order to level informational gaps among them and larger member states. 
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